The history of these three nations formed after World War II – Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia – provided a contrast of how the past can shape the future. This is something The Private Eye and I have been talking a lot about as we wander, as her posts have alluded to.
First, one thing impressed upon us by the couple we met at Cocktail Cycle in Chiang Mai is that Indonesia is a somewhat precarious federation. On one hand, unity with Java provides economic opportunity and drives growth. On the other, Java is where the power lies, and other parts of Indonesia feel that, at times, they have to march to Java’s drum. So a bit like Germany and the EU, albeit without the wounds and distrust of the early 20th century. This became a bit clearer to me as I read about Papua, where armed uprisings against the government are not unheard of in very recent memory, and to which the government answers with executions of political leaders. I was unaware of Timor-Leste’s separation in 2002; The Private Eye commented that she remembered it, but it was at a time when terrorism was flooding international news out of the headlines.
Bali and the Gilis, while part of Indonesia, clearly had their own identity which was not strongly tied to the identity of Indonesia. This is in contrast to Yogyakarta, where Indonesian history was important and presented prominently. Both are technically Muslim nations, but Indonesia has a breadth of cultures and religions; while many of its citizens are Muslim, it seemed more an element of personal rather than national identity. Malaysia, at least Kuala Lumpur, defines itself very much as a Muslim nation, tying its identity to Islam in the Middle Ages and Renaissance.
This very strong Muslim identity makes sense given its history. Throughout the colonialism of the 15th to 20th centuries, the major point of conflict with European colonial powers was whether the people of Malaysia could continue to follow their own customs and religion. The pattern seemed to generally be that the Sultans would sign a treaty granting trade and military rights in return for cultural sovereignty, which the Europeans would soon break, and conflict followed.
This history of not only colonialism but also cultural and religious meddling sheds some light on Malaysia’s split with Singapore and Malaysia’s laws that favor ethnic Malaysians. Where Singapore was a city and port built by the British in the colonial era, Malaysia was a booming hub of trade when European powers arrived. Portugal’s initial efforts were diplomatic; when the Sultan of Malacca took members of the delegation captive and killed a few, Portugal sent a fleet and took the port by force. Colonialism kept Malaysians at the low rungs of the economic ladder. And so where Singapore wants equality among its ethnic groups, Malaysia wants to correct inequalities encouraged by past colonial politics.
And so, its heritage of Islam suppressed for so long, Malaysia, once independent, strongly asserted that part of its identity. The National Museum goes into the different Sultans and when they converted to Islam; the Islamic Art Museum is more notable than the National Art Museum; the space agency has exhibits tying modern concepts of the cosmos to Islam’s astronomers in Al-Andalus and North Africa. Singapore, meanwhile, looks solidly towards the future, less focused on history from 500 years ago.
Malaysia is clearly prospering. The architectural icon of Kuala Lumpur, the Petronas Towers, are the office buildings for an oil company. And so Malaysia also shares that aspect of national identity with many Arab nations, although Malaysia also has a lot of agriculture. The Islamic world is vast. Remember World Without Oil, the game played on web bulletin boards a few years ago? I want to go back and see if anyone seriously explored the implications the end of oil will have to Islam.
— The Professor